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TAX’S TRIVIALITY AS A PAY-REFORMING DEVICE
ANDREW C.W. LUND*
I. INTRODUCTION

P

ERIODICALLY, the federal government has altered the tax rules relating to executive compensation. Sometimes these changes have been
driven by pure tax policy concerns.1 At other times, the changes in tax
policy were motivated by a desire to correct market failure in the executive
pay-setting mechanism. That is, tax intervention was driven largely by intrafirm concerns—usually that managers were extracting rents to the detriment of shareholders and, possibly, other corporate constituencies.
In all events, these attempts to use tax policy to influence executive
compensation have been routinely decried. More particularly, the interventions driven by corporate governance concerns, most prominently Section 162(m)’s limitation on the deductibility of compensation costs and
the Sections 280G/4999 deduction limitation for, and excise tax on, parachute payments, have been widely panned.2 The complaints about these
innovations are varied but tend to coalesce around an accusation that the
intervention is either ineffective, distortive, or both.
This Article is devoted to explaining the ineffectiveness of tax policy
as a response to compensation market failure. In short, market forces seem
to overwhelm whatever prodding the tax code tries to effect. Part II describes Sections 162(m) and 280G/4999 and briefly shows how they have
been largely ineffective in changing compensation practices. Why have
these kinds of tax interventions—the ones that try to correct the pay-setting process between executives and boards—failed? Undoubtedly, there
is a plausible public choice explanation centered on political motivations
and competence. Part III describes this explanation. Parts IV and V, however, suggest that public choice explanations for the failure of governancedriven tax interventions are actually too generous and might lead us to be
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I thank Bridget
Crawford, Gregg Polsky, and David Walker for helpful comments and Ian Sloss for
his research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Fixing Section 409A: Legislative and Administrative
Options, 57 VILL. L. REV. 635 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive
Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY (Randall S. Thomas &
Jennifer Hill eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2). (“The emerging conclusion is that attempts to regulate CEO pay [including tax interventions] have been
mostly unblemished by success.”); Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485,
519–26 (2009); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax
Code, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 877, 884 n.36 (2007); Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap
Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1674–75 (2004).
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too sanguine about the possibility of “better” executive compensation tax
rules in the future. Part IV lays out the basic case that tax interventions, as
observed to this point, have trivial effects on board decision making regarding executive pay. Simply put, the tax penalties pale in comparison
with boards’ perceptions of the performance-related gains to be realized
by either hiring the best (even if most expensive) executive or properly
incentivizing any executive with a particular mix of compensation elements. This intuition has been borne out by empirical studies showing the
extremely modest effects of tax interventions on pay practices.
Part V develops the triviality thesis by recognizing that tax has little
effect on pay practices because the penalties are modest. Were penalties
more significant, they might not be overwhelmed by the considerations
described in Part IV. But Part V offers reasons to believe that tax penalties
in this context will almost never be implemented so as to be so heavyhanded. Most importantly, many policymakers and almost all scholars believe that there is substantial heterogeneity among firms regarding optimal compensation practices, leading to a reluctance to adopt tax penalties
with real bite that feel closer to mandatory rules.
II. SECTIONS 162(M)

AND

280G/4999

IN

ACTION

Section 162(m) of the Code was enacted in 1993. It operates by limiting the business-expense deduction available to public firms for amounts
paid to “top five” executives.3 Specifically, a firm may not deduct amounts
paid to such officers in excess of $1 million annually. The deduction limitation may be avoided by qualifying the compensation that exceeds $1 million, usually by paying under a plan that (i) provides for payments based
on objective performance goals, (ii) is approved by an independent compensation committee of the board, and (iii) is approved by a majority of
the shareholders after disclosure of the material terms of the compensation arrangement.4
Thus, Section 162(m) evinces a preference for contingent forms of
pay such as performance bonuses, at- or out-of-the-money stock options,
and stock awards that vest upon achievement of performance targets.
That preference is based on a significant theoretical literature produced
by legal academics and financial economists describing the importance of
performance-based compensation. This standard account observes that
performance-based pay works to align incentives and mitigate agency costs
3. Top five executives include the CEO and the four next most highly compensated officers. See TREAS. Reg. § 1.162-27(c)(2) (2012). The definition of “officer” is determined in accordance with the rules for executive compensation
disclosure under Regulation S-K. Id. In effect, then, the covered employees for
purposes of § 162(m) are the same as those for whom compensation disclosure is
mandated unless the firm’s chief financial officer is not among its five highest paid
officers. In that case, disclosure would capture that officer but not the fifth most
highly paid officer, while § 162(m) would cover in the opposite fashion.
4. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2006).
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otherwise borne by public firms when they are run by non-owner executives.5 Section 162(m)’s additional requirements of independent director
and shareholder approval respond to the additional concern that nominally performance-based pay might not truly be “performance-based” because of the clubby nature of the board/executive relationship.6 Working
together, these requirements for receiving a full deduction were intended
to produce optimal intrafirm governance outcomes, heightening executive incentives to maximize profits and reducing their ability to extract
rents.7
As most of those who have studied the issue concede,8 Section
162(m) has been largely unsuccessful in achieving its governance goals.
This failure may be driven by forces beyond the legislative design,9 but
nevertheless the design itself is problematic. Its preference for completely
performance-contingent pay may often lead to suboptimal contracts.
First, it encourages workarounds through the use of deferred compensation arrangements such that the actual taxable/deductible event occurs
once the executive in question is no longer a covered officer.10 Second,
the design of Section 162(m) advantages options vis-a-vis restricted stock.
At-the-money or out-of-the-money options introduce convexity into compensation arrangements thereby increasing risk-taking incentives,11 but it
is less clear that this heightened convexity will provide optimal incentives
in a significant set of cases.12 Finally, the definition of the performancebased qualification allows firms to deduct expenses even in cases where
the compensation is hardly performance-based.13
5. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138. For more on the
history of the pay-for-performance movement, see Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D.
Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2011).
6. For the formal account of this view, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
49–51 (2004).
7. See Mullane, supra note 2, at 519–26.
8. For a pessimistic view of section 162(m)’s success, see supra note 2.
9. For a discussion of other influences, see infra notes 23–39 and accompanying text.
10. See Polsky, supra note 2, at 893–96. But see Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1205, 1207–08 (2011) (suggesting that bank executives’ inside debt holdings may
be beneficial).
11. See, e.g., John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. Apr. 2003, at 27, 33.
12. See id. at 33; see also Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term
Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1940–41 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 2, at 523–25 (“As an initial matter, satisfying
the performance-based requirements is not challenging. Treasury regulations provide that a performance goal does not need to be ‘based upon an increase or
positive result under a business criterion and could include, for example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic losses.’ Furthermore, once the thresh-
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To add insult to injury, it may be that Section 162(m) had the unintended consequence of pushing pay higher at firms where executives had
not previously earned $1 million.14 The legislative announcement that
salaries in excess of $1 million were excessive in Congress’s view seems to
have implied that any salary below $1 million was reasonable. On this account, Section 162(m) was able to set a norm that quickly ratcheted up
executive salaries, particularly given the Lake Wobegon world of pay-setting and pay-setting’s transparency due to heightened disclosure rules.15
The problems with Section 162(m)’s deduction-limitation regime are
more significant in magnitude but not especially different in kind from
that other attempt to influence corporate governance through the tax
code—the restrictions on golden parachute payments to executives at acquired firms. Similar to Section 162(m), Section 280G operates to limit a
firm’s deduction for compensation paid. Under Section 280G, the compensation in question involves payments made to highly compensated individuals that are contingent upon a change in control in the firm.16 If
the contingent payment is greater than three times the individual’s fiveyear average take home pay prior to the change in control, then it qualifies as a “parachute payment” and the excess of that amount over the average take home pay is a non-deductible expense for the firm. Section 4999
hits the other side of the payor-payee equation and imposes an excise tax
on the executive receiving the excess parachute payment.17
Like Section 162(m), Sections 280G and 4999 have hardly met resounding success. In the realm of unintended consequences, Section
280G seems to have driven an increase in the adoption of change-in-control agreements18 and normalized a “2.999X” standard for change-in-control payments.19 By leading to both the proliferation and normalization of
these payments around a “~3X” multiple, Sections 280G and 4999 arguaold requirements have been met, there is no limit to the amount of performancebased compensation that can be deducted.” (footnote omitted)).
14. See Steven Balsam & David Ryan, Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case
of CEOs Hired After the Imposition of 162(m), 22(4) J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 599,
617–18 (2007); see generally David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive
Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Scott Schaefer & Rachel M. Hayes, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon
Effect, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 280 (2009) (discussing previous suggestions of phenomenon
and developing game-theoretic model for it).
16. I.R.C. § 280G(2)(c)(2) (2006) (defining “highly-compensated individual”
as one “who is (or would be if the individual were an employee) a member of the
group consisting of the highest paid 1 percent of the employees of the corporation
or, if less, the highest paid 250 employees of the corporation”).
17. See id. § 4999 (imposing “tax equal to 20 percent of the amount of [an
excess parachute payment]”).
18. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 14 n.20 (quoting studies by Richard Alpern
and Gail McGowan).
19. See Miske, supra note 2, at 1679–84 (“By codifying a salary multiple,
§ 280G created a floor on parachute benefits that directors and executives could
point to as a congressionally sanctioned standard of reasonableness.”).
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bly increased compensation costs at firms.20 Just as in the case of 162(m)
(heightened convexity), the propriety of the governance ends purported
to be achieved by Sections 280G/4999 are a matter of some dispute, with
many suggesting that high golden parachute payments increase shareholder value by making executives more open to takeovers.21 Finally (and
most importantly for the purposes of this Article), easy workarounds were
developed to blunt the effect of the tax rule,22 in particular, tax gross-ups.
III. THE STANDARD CRITIQUE OF TAXING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ENDS
Why does it seem so hard for Congress to properly tax executive compensation so as to improve intrafirm governance outcomes? Perhaps most
obviously, there is a simple political economy story that calls into question
the likely effectiveness of executive compensation intervention.23 Omari
Simmons, for one, has previously noted the peculiar political characteristics of executive compensation debates.24 In essence, information about
the efficacy of various corporate reforms is in short supply and executive
compensation is one of the most salient issues to the voting public. As a
result, legislators may deviate from efficient policy outcomes more than
they would otherwise in order to satisfy their constituents’ desire for action, even if only the symbolic sort.25
The special nature of executive compensation thus subjects federal
tax intervention to an even more serious critique than is generally leveled
at congressional action in the corporate governance arena. For instance,
Roberta Romano famously called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s mandates
“quack corporate governance.”26 As she described it, the law’s quack-ish
20. Kevin Murphy also contends that Section 280G encouraged firms to
shorten vesting periods in equity plans to avoid a greater charge in case calculations under Sections 280G/4999 needed to be made to account for the gain to
executives by the accelerated vesting caused by the change in control. See Murphy,
supra note 2, at 15.
21. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 2, at 513 n.109.
22. See id. at 517–19.
23. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at 2 (“A larger part of the problem is that
the regulation is often mis-intended. The regulations are inherently political and
driven by political agendas . . . .”).
24. See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 332 (2009).
25. See id. at 329 (“Knee-jerk responses to populist outrage may not qualify as
earnestly pursuing the public interest, especially when symbolic measures are used
to mitigate outrage from less informed constituencies. Given the credence characteristics of corporate reform, federal lawmakers have greater capability and incentives to camouflage their rent seeking.”); see also id. at 332 (“The credence
characteristics of executive compensation reform provide self-interested lawmakers
with greater flexibility to choose a diagnosis of the executive compensation problem that is the most politically profitable. As a result, lawmaker diagnosis and recommended treatment regimens are at times inconsistent and muddled.”).
26. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1521 (2005).
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governance provisions were largely the product of policy entrepreneurs
who found themselves in a position to drive the legislative process because
legislators were ignorant and uninterested in corporate governance provisions and the fact of the crisis post-Enron provided a push to accomplish
something.27 Romano rejects the notion that those governance mandates
represented merely symbolic politics,28 but notes that the law’s enhanced
criminal penalties for corporate actors may have been just that.29 This
dismal account of the production of business law reform corresponds with
other post-crisis moments where regulation of questionable effect was enacted to slake the public thirst for accountability.30
More recently, Stephen Bainbridge has leveled a similar charge of
quackery at the Dodd-Frank legislation passed in response to the financial
crisis of 2008.31 Again, a crisis pressured legislators to do something, leading them to ready-made solutions provided by policy entrepreneurs.32
Again, some of the actions may have been merely symbolic.33 And, again,
it is far from clear that the corporate governance rules adopted under
Dodd-Frank are justified by any evidence or plausible theory of firm behavior.34 Bainbridge sums up the characteristics of corporate governance
quackery:
1. It is a bubble law, enacted in response to a major negative
economic event.
2. It is enacted in a crisis environment.
3. It was a response to a populist backlash against corporations
and/or markets.
4. It is adopted at the federal rather than state level.
5. It transfers power from the states to the federal government.
6. Interest groups that are strong at the federal level but weak at
the Delaware level support it.
7. Typically, it is not a novel proposal, but rather a long-standing
agenda item of some powerful interest group.
8. The empirical evidence cited in support of the proposal is, at
best, mixed and often shows the proposal to be unwise.35
Not all of these characteristics would seem to be required before leveling
the charge of ineffective and possibly destructive political pandering at a
27.
28.
29.
30.

id. at 1568–85.
id. at 1585–87.
id.
generally STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860 (1998).
31. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1797–1819 (2011).
32. Id. at 1786–87.
33. Id. at 1783, 1796.
34. Id. at 1818–19.
35. Id. at 1796.
See
See
See
See
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regulatory measure. In fact, the cause of the crisis (1), anti-federalism
markers (4-6), and the measure’s history (7) are arguably unimportant for
doing so.
On Bainbridge’s terms, then, we should be concerned with post-crisis
legislation that manifests a popular backlash against business without any
evidence in favor of doing so. Along these lines, the danger of “quackery”
is probably stronger in matters of executive compensation than in governance matters generally. It is perhaps useful to note that a large chunk of
Dodd-Frank’s governance provisions were executive compensation provisions.36 Executive compensation is hugely salient to the press and voters.37 As one homely example, consider the recent conflagration over a
report demonstrating that some public companies paid more to their
CEOs than they did in federal income taxes.38 The urge to do something
in response to populist outrage is likely to be among the strongest a legislator faces and, accordingly, we should not expect much good to come
from compensation-related legislation.
I have no quibble with the characterization of tax measures directed
at reining in executive compensation as something akin to “quackery.” It
may very well be an apt one and the tale of political economy alone might
help explain much of the trouble with tax intervention in executive compensation that aims to achieve ends unrelated to corporate governance.39
But, in the remaining sections of this Part, I wish to emphasize that the
case against tax incursions into executive compensation is much more
damning than implied by the traditional complaints from political
economy.
IV. THE TRIVIALITY

OF

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TAX RULES

Most importantly, taxing executive compensation for governance purposes will have trivial governance effects under almost every plausible regime.40 Boards, whether facing a competitive market for executive talent,
beholden to powerful executives, or both, will not usually negotiate differently in response to a new tax regime. Because tax considerations are generally overwhelmed by all of the other pressures found in the
compensation-setting process, we should expect firms to agree to bear any
36. One prominent law firm summarized ten “significant” corporate governance provisions, five of which were related to executive compensation. See Scott L.
Landau et al., Dodd-Frank Act Reforms Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance
for All Public Companies, CLIENT ALERT (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New
York, N.Y.), July 15, 2010, available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/CorpSec_CorpSec-Tech_ECB_Alert6_07-15-2010.pdf.
37. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Compensation as Signaling, 64 FLA. L. REV. 591,
613–618; see also Simmons, supra note 24, at 322–23.
38. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Where Pay For Chiefs Outstrips U.S. Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011, at B1.
39. See Polsky supra note 1, at 643–51.
40. For a discussion questioning the limits of political plausibility, see supra
notes 23–39.
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costs imposed by the tax rules unless some non-tax reason arises to cause
them not to do so.41
At the most basic level, when tax law becomes a species of corporate
law it becomes subject to the “triviality” attribution leveled by Bernie Black
over twenty years ago.42 Black’s claim was that state corporate law would
have literally no effect on governance outcomes in most cases. That law
would either be (i) market mimicking in that it simply duplicated what the
market would have otherwise required, (ii) avoidable via easy
workarounds, (iii) changeable over time via political or litigation pressure,
or (iv) unimportant.43 The claim for tax law’s triviality made here is less
robust, though it implies some version of the “workaround” and “unimportance” strands of Black’s framework.
Admittedly, tax rules that increase the compensation burden will have
some effect on the firm as the new tax will be a cost that must be paid.44
That cost may qualify the tax rule as “important” or “unimportant” relative
to firm value, but this is beside the point. The charge of triviality in this
instance simply means that the tax incursions in executive compensation
will have no effect on the way in which firms pay managers.45 Put another
way, tax is trivial with respect to the sphere of activity Congress intends to
impact when it uses sticks to prod firms.
Why are compensation patterns so insensitive to tax rules? Consider
the baseline assumption animating most tax interventions that massive
market failure exists in the compensation bargaining process at public
companies. Boards that might negotiate aggressively with managers to arrive at an optimal pay package face incentive and relational problems in
doing so. Most famously, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker suggested that managerial power over directors—of both hard and soft varieties—characterized much of executive compensation contracting.46 There is more to
their powerful argument, but, essentially, it conceives of executives being
able to extract rents during pay negotiations with relatively obsequious
boards constrained only by “outrage costs” in the form of shareholder revolt, bad press, a governmental response, or some combination thereof.47
41. Alternatively, tax penalties could become so extraordinary that there
might be a constraint on firms’ abilities to absorb them without the capital markets
exacting some sort of price. For a discussion rebutting this proposition and suggesting that there is good reason to think that tax penalties will not reach such
levels, see infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
42. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544–46 (1990).
43. Id. at 551–52.
44. See id. at 563 (discussing costs imposed by 280G and 4999).
45. If the burden is high relative to firm value, the tax may shift valuations as
to make private firms more attractive to capital markets than the public firms subject to the tax rules.
46. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 72–73; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M.
Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 783–95 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46 at 786.
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The managerial power thesis has been criticized both for its inability
to explain why certain arrangements exist and, more often, for its implicit
or explicit implications for reform.48 Regardless of the merits of that debate, one can certainly conclude that some level of distortive managerial
power exists such that there is some slack at some firms. Boards may not be
completely beholden to CEOs and they may often operate in good faith to
arrive at the optimal pay package, all things considered. Still, they face
informational problems49 and cognitive biases that may lead, for example,
to an overvaluation of the impact of managerial talent.50 Thus, whether
managerial power of the kind Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker suggest is
strong or weak, we should expect to see some level of excess compensation
packages for public company managers.51 Given a background level of
managerial power, tax rules, it is thought, might help in moving executive
compensation contracts back towards optimality.52 Hence, Section
162(m) attempts to push firms towards more performance-sensitive arrangements on the assumption that powerful managers are able to systematically distort outcomes toward less performance sensitive
arrangements.53
But precisely because of this baseline assumption regarding the manager’s bargaining position, the tax penalty has a very serious strike against
it in changing firm behavior. First, assume the strong managerial power
view suggested by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker. Recall under this theory
48. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 5, at 684 n.14.
49. See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1146–47
(2005) (noting that even boards negotiating pay packages in good faith are reliant
on others for relevant information).
50. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 190–91 (2004).
51. See Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note 49, at 1142 (noting that executive
compensation contracts are almost sure to be second-best efficient).
52. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 2, at 522 (“The Senate Finance Committee
believed ‘excessive compensation [would] be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations [was] limited.’ Section 162(m) thus appears to
have two aims: (1) to curtail levels of executive pay, and (2) to encourage a
stronger connection between pay and performance.” (footnote omitted)); see also
David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem 7-8 (Boston Univ. Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 11-50, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1944115 (offering a tax solution to corporate governance
failure attributable to managerial power).
53. There are reasons, however, to think that managers might actually prefer
performance sensitive pay designs. First, managers may be overconfident and discount the possibility of firm failure under their watch. See Tung-Hsiao Yang & Don
M. Chance, The Effect of Executive Confidence, Ability and Private Beliefs on the
Valuation of Executive Stock Options 7–8 (March 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783034. Second, managers may recognize that contingent pay is generally less salient in the eyes of shareholders and
the business press and therefore subject to a more relaxed outrage constraint. See
Lund & Polsky, supra note 5, at 721–23.
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executives hold too much sway over pay-setting boards and, as a result,
observed pay practices tend to be both too rich and too insensitive to performance.54 It is hard to see how the incentives provided by Section
162(m) could do much work in this world.55 A truly powerful executive
might simply prevent the restructuring of his or her pay into qualifying,
performance-based types. In that case, the firm would lose the deduction,
thereby harming shareholders. Even if Section 162(m) disclosure provided a focal point that activated outrage, Section 162(m)’s requirement
that any pay over $1 million be performance-based would simply shift the
mode of rent extraction away from salary increases to performance-based
compensation increases, deferred compensation increases, or the
camouflaging of performance-insensitive pay (assuming imperfect tax regulations permit it). Most importantly, managers with power over their
boards, forced to take on risky pay, should simply demand more of it to
compensate themselves for the increased risk.56 Even when the risky pay
has a significantly higher expected value than the less risky kind, the risky
pay is less salient to shareholders and the business press (and obviously tax
regulators) precisely because of the risk and the sense that an executive
must have earned pay that is performance-based.57
Section 162(m) does require that performance-based pay be approved by an independent board and shareholders which might mitigate
such rent extraction. But the kind of board independence required by
Section 162(m) is not materially more restrictive than compensation committee independence requirements in place at the time of its adoption
relevant to avoiding short-swing profit liability under securities laws.58 If
managerial power over boards was a problem then or now, Section
162(m)’s safeguard of independent board approval seems to do very little.59 Moreover, even unhappy shareholders are at a disadvantage when
faced with approving a performance-based pay plan in that a veto would
potentially cause the firm to forego any deduction.60
If one adopts a less strong view of managerial power, tax intervention
might again be thought appropriate to remedy residual rent accumulation
54. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 784.
55. Bebchuk and Fried say as much themselves. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 6, at 72–73.
56. See, e.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 5 at 147 (“Creating better incentives
for CEOs almost necessarily means increasing the financial risk CEOs face.”).
57. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 5, at 718–23.
58. Rule 16b-3 excludes from short-swing profit liability officers’ exercise of
an option and subsequent sale of the acquired security provided the options were
awarded by “non-employee” directors. Section 162(m)’s independence requirements do not contain certain exclusions for related-party transactions that the
short-swing profit rules do, though there is no indication that the Treasury intended to draw this distinction when the regulations for Section 162(m) were
promulgated.
59. And if managerial power is not much of a problem, then the distortive
capacity of a rule like Section 162(m) would overwhelm its benefits.
60. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 49–51.
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due to some other sort of market failure afflicting the pay-setting process,
e.g., informational problems or systematic overvaluation of executives’ labor. Even then, however, the market forces pushing towards excess pay
should overwhelm all but the most penal tax rules. Consider the likely
possibility that excessive pay is at least partially caused by distortions in the
CEO labor market such that prospective managers have overly inflated negotiating power.61 In order for tax to correct the problem, one has to
have an account of how a relatively small tax penalty (and one that is generally restricted to a lost deduction for the company such that it is externalized to shareholders) is able to overcome that pressure. Tax cannot
make that power go away and, given its economic effect, should barely be
expected to blunt it.
As a result, the governance changes encouraged by the tax rules are
largely ignored or distorted. Moreover, whether the resulting tax penalties are nominally incurred by the firm (Sections 162(m) and 280G) or the
manager (Section 4999), the firm will usually bear the cost of those penalties because of the negotiating dynamic. To the extent that this model
breaks down at all, it does so not because of the tax rules, but rather because of an exogenous market constraint.62 Unless tax is somehow focusing market attention on some objectionable pay practice and therefore
activating an otherwise dormant constraint, it does almost nothing other
than increase firm expenses.
Finally, if strong or weak managerial power does not exist or does not
lead to market failure in compensation setting, the case for governancedriven tax intervention becomes obviously weaker.63 A number of financial economists have offered reasons for thinking that the executive compensation market is relatively efficient. For example, Kevin Murphy and
Ján Zábojnı́k posit that the nature of the CEO position has changed in
recent years such that managerial ability, which is transferrable across
firms, now trumps firm-specific knowledge in importance.64 As a result,
we should expect to see an increase in the price of talented managers’
labor.65 If true, there would be no bargaining problem capable of amelioration through regulation, as heightened levels of executive compensation
61. See KHURANA, supra note 50, at 26.
62. For an example of how market constraints may shift the burden sharing of
tax penalties, see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
63. There may, of course, be broader tax goals that such intervention might
promote, though measures targeted at executive compensation seem likely to be
an inefficient means of achieving those goals.
64. See Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojnı́k, Managerial Capital and the Market for
CEOs 4 (Queen’s Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 1110, Apr. 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984376.
65. See id. at 24–30. Of course, the fact that firms are increasingly likely to
hire outside CEOs may be linked to a less rational explanation. See KHURANA, supra
note 50, at 47 (noting market failures in the CEO labor market). If true, the
higher wages commanded by CEOs would not represent an efficient outcome and
tax intervention might be appropriate.
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simply reflect the increased competition for managerial talent.66 Any tax
penalties would impose needless costs on firms. But, to be clear, we
should expect those costs to be unrelated to incentive reduction or retention problems as firms should simply choose to take the tax penalty and
hold firm on the optimal compensation contract to avoid more damaging
managerial departures or other behavioral defections.67 The distortion
instead would occur in the capital markets as firm’s expected cash flows
would have to be discounted by the tax.68
Experience with tax interventions bear out these predictions of triviality. Consider first, Section 162(m) and the push for increasingly performance-sensitive pay. To be sure, executive pay is riskier and more
contingent on firm performance than it once was. Brian Hall and Jeffrey
Liebman found that the median elasticity of CEO pay relative to firm performance doubled between 1980 and 1994, driven by both an overall increase in payouts and a shift away from fixed pay to contingent pay.69 The
trend has continued over the last decade plus, but it is interesting to note
that the Hall and Liebman study covered a period almost entirely before
Section 162(m)’s enactment meaning that at least the early part of the
drive towards more performance-sensitive pay had little to do with tax
consequences.
In another study, Hall and Liebman analyzed tax rate changes during
the 1980s and 90s and found little effect of those changes on pay components.70 Rather, the increased emphasis on stock options during that period was apparently driven by market forces beyond tax rules.71 With
respect to Section 162(m) in particular, Hall and Liebman find evidence
of a “minor substitution of performance-related pay for salary” after the
enactment of the rule.72 Yet even this small substitution effect is impossi66. For another defense of the efficiency of the compensation-setting market,
see Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note 49, at 1165–69 (noting that U.S. firms had
higher returns than lower-paying international peers during period in which U.S.
pay increased). Core et al. offer a more robust attack on Bebchuk and Fried’s
managerial power thesis on the grounds that contracting costs make arm’s-length
bargaining impossible and permit a process that involves some level of managerial
power to be optimal at a given firm. Id. at 1160–65. Note, however, that this would
not preclude regulatory intervention aimed at balancing out the distortions created by those contracting costs. See id. at 1182.
67. There should be a level of tax that would be high enough to completely
offset the gains achieved by the optimal compensation contract such that firms
would begin to deviate. But see infra notes 89–93 for reasons to expect that level to
remain unmet.
68. See Walker, supra note 52, at 9.
69. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,
113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 655 (1998).
70. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in 14 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1 (James M. Poterba ed., 2000).
71. See id. at 3 (“Instead, changes in corporate governance, especially in the
role of large institutional investors, appear to have provided the main impetus for
the increase in stock-based pay.”).
72. Id. at 36.
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ble to tease out from the increased market pressure to pay in performance-based pay during this period.73 The smallness of the observed
substitution seems to indicate that tax played a very small role, if any.
Similarly, Nancy Rose and Catherine Wolfram found little evidence
that Section 162(m) had an impact on salary growth rates.74 Like Hall
and Liebman, they looked to differences between “affected”—meaning
firms with predicted compensation near Section 162(m)’s $1 million
cap—and “unaffected” firms’ changes in salary growth around Section
162(m) enactment. In the majority of their tests, they found no significant
evidence of differences between such firms.75 In fact, they concluded by
noting the fragility of the Section 162(m) effects and suggesting that Section 162(m) has apparently had little impact on compensation practices.76
How do these post hoc findings manifest themselves in firms’ pay decisions? First, a large number of firms simply forego deductions because
of Section 162(m) rather than limit an executive’s salary to $1 million.
Steven Balsam and Jennifer Yin studied a number of “firm years” between
1994 and 1998 and found that in almost 38% of them the firm forfeited
deductions by failing to comply with Section 162(m).77 That percentage
consisted of one or more firm years at almost exactly half of the sample
firms.78 About a third of the forfeitures were caused by salaries in excess
of $1 million and a minority of the forfeiting firms qualified their shortterm bonus plans as performance-based.79 Firms consistently opted for
compensation flexibility over tax savings.80
More recently, many firms have shifted away from stock options toward restricted stock. Restricted stock is essentially a heavily discounted
73. See id. at 24.
74. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the
Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 166 (2002).
75. See id. They did find higher variation among “affected” firms that did not
adopt plans to qualify pay as performance-based. Id. It is hard to interpret this
datum, however, because plan qualification has no tax effect on the salary payments that are the fluctuating dependent variable.
76. See id. (“This conclusion is consistent with the views expressed by many
compensation consultants and corporate directors we have consulted. . . . Our
results suggest that corporate pay may be more insulated from this type of blunt
political pressure than its from the more direct pressure brought to bear at the
individual firm level by stakeholder groups or through the regulatory process.”
(citations omitted)). But see Balsam & Ryan, supra note 14, at 600 (arguing that
stickiness of pay practices for incumbent CEOS at time of Section 162(m)’s adoption account for lack of evidence for its effect).
77. See Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit
Tax Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million-Dollar Cap,
24(4) J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 314 (2005).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 315.
80. See also Austin Reitenga, Steve Buchheit, Qin Jennifer Yin & Terry Baker,
CEO Bonus Pay, Tax Policy, and Earnings Management, 24 J. AMER. TAXATION ASS’N,
2002, at 1, 2–3.
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option.81 Because of that discount, restricted stock cannot count as qualified compensation for Section 162(m) purposes unless its vesting is conditioned on separate performance goals.82 Yet in 2006, restricted stock
grants became the largest component of pay packages for senior executives at large public companies, pushing stock options to second place.83
This change was driven by any number of reasons, but occurred in spite of
the plainly negative tax considerations.84
There is less direct evidence of the effect of Sections 280G and 4999
on change in control severance packages, but perhaps that is because it
was immediately apparent that they would have a very small one. Firms
were willing to work around the tax rules, forfeiting deductions and grossing executives up for the cost of the excise tax. This happened despite the
fact that the resulting tax impact was significantly higher than it would
have been had the executive borne the brunt of it.85 Of late, gross-ups
have become more limited.86 But nothing changed in the tax regime to
bring about this shift. Rather, institutional investors and other activists
have begun to push back against Section 4999 gross-ups after twenty years
of their proliferation. The reduction in gross-ups has correlated directly
with the adoption of anti-gross-up guidelines by the most significant proxy
advisor in 2009.87 What we see, then, is the clash between market forces—
a competitive market for managerial talent on the one hand and the effect
of increasing shareholder activism on the other—not anything remotely
driven by tax rules.88
81. Specifically, it is an option to purchase company stock with an exercise
price of $0.
82. Performance-vesting restricted stock (performance shares) makes up only
a fraction of restricted stock awards. See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity
Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 632 (2011)
(finding time-vested restricted stock accounted for 45% of restricted stock awards).
83. See id. at 633.
84. See id. at 634–39.
85. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 2, at 517–18.
86. See Jennifer S. Conway & Nicole F. Foster, Golden Parachute Tax Gross-Ups:
Weathering the Storm?, BLOOMBERG L. REPS. (Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New
York, N.Y.), available at http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3251629_1.PDF.
87. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2009 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 38
(2008), available at http://www.usfunds.com/media/files/pdfs/compliancepolicies/RMG2009SummaryGuidelinesUnitedStates.pdf. Interestingly, proxy advisors
are apparently sanguine about the deductions lost by firms that have shifted toward restricted shares. See, e.g., ISS, 2011 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY
37–42 (2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicy
SummaryGuidelines20110127.pdf (expressing no opinion about the choice to use
options or restricted stock nor any view about the different tax results implicated
thereby).
88. Moreover, a relatively simple workaround for anti-gross-up rules would be
to simply top up the initial severance payment so that, even after the 10% excise
tax, the net payment to the executive is the same. It is unclear whether this strategy has been utilized in a post-gross-up environment.
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TAX RESPONSES

Much of the triviality analysis in the preceding section can be attributed to the magnitude of the penalty imposed by the tax intervention. For
example, imagine if Section 162(m) not only limited the ability of a firm
to claim a deduction but also imposed a significant surtax on a firm that
paid over $1 million to a top five executive in non-performance-based pay.
In that case, we might very well expect firms to alter their behavior in
response to tax incentives. The tipping point in this context may be
higher or lower than someone might predict, but the basic point should
be uncontroversial: there is a point at which tax costs could outweigh the
costs of deviating from market-based pay outcomes. As a result, much of
the argument for triviality implies that the costs imposed by tax intervention are relatively small, at least in comparison with those deviation costs.
Why are the tax burdens so low? One way to conceive of tax rules
with more significant penalties is as coercive regulation. An extreme tax is
effectively a mandatory rule. But despite all of the hand wringing about
excessive executive pay, few critics have endorsed some sort of coercive
regulation limiting executive pay. For instance, David Walker, one of the
main proponents of the managerial power thesis described above, has expressed concerns about distortions occasioned by coercive compensation
regulation, e.g., pay caps.89 The concern about distortive effects brought
on by mandatory rules presupposes an important point: firm heterogeneity with regard to optimal pay packages.90 Essentially, the worry is that
coercive regulation is too blunt an instrument and will impose a one-sizefits-all rule on a world where there is substantial difference between firms
in compensation needs. As Walker puts it, “[p]rices result in greater freedom of behavior and less distortion [than do sanctions].”91
For example, it would be a net negative socially, if some firms, in response to new information regarding the benefits of risk-taking, were unable to move away from stock options and toward restricted stock in
compensation packages. A mandatory version of Section 162(m) that required all executive pay to be performance-based would therefore be
problematic at least to the extent there is significant heterogeneity over
such matters across firms.92 It is possible that the case for the heterogeneity of optimal pay packages has been overstated or at least under-supported, but it certainly holds a significant amount of influence even
89. See Walker, supra note 52, at 53–56.
90. See, e.g., id. at 51 (“Even if executive pay levels are too high systematically,
we do not know the exact degree of excess pay and there is likely to be substantial
heterogeneity in the amount of excess pay from firm to firm.”). Alternatively, the
concern about mandatory rules could be driven simply by a fear of regulatory
mistake.
91. Id. at 50.
92. If restricted stock dominated stock options as a pay choice across firms,
then coercive regulation would only be problematic to the extent it misinterpreted
the data and reached the wrong policy prescription.
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among critics of executive pay practices. Accordingly, there are few serious proposals to mandate certain payment levels to executives.
For exactly the same reasons, though, we should not expect any tax
intervention to be particularly aggressive. If those who are concerned
about executive pay levels are unwilling to consider coercive regulation,
how likely are they to consider tax penalties that truly tilt the scales when
pay decisions are being made? Yet, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, absent extreme tax penalties, any tax intervention is bound to
be of little effect beyond imposing costs on firms. Many may want to
change compensation practices, but most are too scared of doing so and
causing harm.
Aside from interfirm heterogeneity, there is also likely to be substantial intrafirm heterogeneity with regard to optimal pay packages over time.
Take, for example, some firms’ revealed preference for restricted stock
over stock options reflecting a reevaluation of the best set of risk-taking
incentives.93 Even if every public firm in 1994 would have benefited from a
coerced move to stock options via a more penal Section 162(m) regime,
within a matter of years that state of affairs could have shifted. At that
point, the coercive Section 162(m) regime would have produced suboptimal results making it too costly for firms to adapt. It is possible that the
coercive tax law could then have been changed, but it seems more than
plausible to expect any changes to lag behind the market shift. Thus, even
if firms are not as different from each other in terms of compensation
needs as is generally suspected, draconian tax interventions may still be
problematic. This recognition too leads us along the path of relatively
weak tax interventions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the tension between ineffectiveness and coercion, the best
claim to be made for governance-driven tax interventions is that they may
be able to focus the more powerful market forces on particular practices.
Thus, Section 4999 could be seen as causing the need for gross-ups, which
eventually prove a convenient lightning rod for outrage costs. In the same
way, Section 162(m) (non-)compliance patterns could have generated political and market pressure on firms to change their practices. But note
that, in either case tax is more or less beside the point. It simply serves as a
tool by which some compensation norm is expressed and tested by a disclosure rule.
It would have been just as easy for, say, RiskMetrics to announce
guidelines for severance multiples in 2009 in the absence of guidance
from Section 280G or Section 4999. Tax rules have no monopoly on providing a focal point for market outrage —disclosure rules seem much
more important in that regard. In fact, to the extent tax rules miss the
93. For a discussion of firms’ preference for restricted stock over stock options, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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market’s preferences in establishing that focal point, as they appear to
have done with Section 162(m), they may impose unnecessary tax-related
costs in the process. If tax is reliant on market forces galvanizing around
the norms it establishes, why not just rely on those market forces to establish such norms? This seems particularly sensible in a world where large
institutional investors and shareholder advisors are more than capable of
concocting detailed compensation guidelines.
Alternatively, an ambitious researcher could seek to demonstrate that
firms are not that heterogeneous with respect to their compensation
needs. If that were the case, coercive regulation or tax interventions with
teeth might be back on the table, at least insofar as the risk of regulatory
mistake were minimized. But until that day comes, it might be best to
simply refrain from using tax tools to try and achieve corporate governance outcomes.
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